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Abstract:
This paper explores the importance of Dutch investments in the US manufacturing
industry over the period 1950-1995.Until the mid-1970s Dutch investments, though
considerable,  were primarily concentrated in the petroleum sector and therefore natural-
resource seeking in nature. Dutch MNEs have gradually expanded their operations in the
US in response to the changing competitiveness of the US relative to the Netherlands.
The extent and structure of Dutch value-adding activities in the US reflect the changing
motives for the investments. Dutch FDI activity has gone from trade-supportive in the
1950s and 1960s, to import-substituting and market-seeking in the 1970s, and
rationalized and efficiency-seeking in the 1980s. There are also indications of strategic
asset-seeking FDI activity in the late 1980s and early 1990s in line with the developments
associated with the age of alliance capitalism. In the early 1980s, the Netherlands was the
largest investor in the US, but both the UK and Japan have taken over this position since.
Dutch investments show a reorientation towards Europe with the increasing importance
of the EU, and although the Netherlands still lists high on the ranks of competitive
countries, the Ownership advantages of Dutch firms have declined relative to those of
UK and Japanese firms. 
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INTRODUCTION
Although the Netherlands, as with most small open economies, is highly
internationalised, its multinational enterprises (MNEs) are spread across a greater variety
of sectors and are engaged in a greater extent of foreign value-adding activities than most
other small economies. The Netherlands accounted for 5.8 percent of the total worldwide
stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 1995, while MNEs from Sweden and
Switzerland, two other small economies that are also highly internationalised, accounted
for about 2.3 percent and 4.0 percent respectively (UN 1996). Furthermore, the activities
of Dutch firms are considerably more internationalised than that of firms from most other
countries, in terms of the geographic distribution of their subsidiaries, with overseas
markets in some instances accounting for well over 70 percent of their sales.
Furthermore, they are engaged in much ‘deeper’ overseas investments in terms of types
of value adding activity: while most MNEs concentrate their high value adding activity
(such as R&D) at home, Dutch MNEs conduct half their total R&D activities outside
their home country (Patel 1995).
The process of globalisation - here defined as the increasing convergence of
income levels, consumption patterns and technological levels of the industrial countries -
has been associated with an increase in the preference for MNEs from the industrial
countries to concentrate their overseas value-adding activities in other converging
economies (Dunning and Narula 1997). In line with this, Dutch MNEs have been
increasing their presence in the rest of the Triad, and away from developing countries.
One of the primary destinations of Dutch FDI has been the United States (US), which,
apart from purely historical factors, has also, both due its market size, as well as by being
a source for natural and technological assets, continued to attract a large share of Dutch
FDI. Indeed, the US accounted for approximately 25.9 percent of its total outward FDI
stock in 1994 (OECD 1996). Dutch MNEs share this interest in the US with many other
advanced industrial economies, as the US is the largest single destination for inward FDI.
What is perhaps more interesting is that Dutch MNEs are amongst the largest inward
3investors in the US, far exceeding all other countries of equivalent size. At its peak in
1980, Dutch FDI represented almost a quarter of all inward stock in the US. In
manufacturing investment, Dutch FDI in the US reached its peak as the largest inward
investor in the manufacturing sector in 1984, with 24.1 percent of all inward
manufacturing stock.
These almost incomprehensibly large figures notwithstanding, there have been
considerable dynamic changes taking place within the activities of Dutch MNEs on a
sectorally desegregated level, as well as relative to the activities of its international
competitors that deserve deeper analysis and further comment, some of which shed light
on the changing competitiveness of Dutch MNEs. For instance, although the share of the
Dutch FDI stocks in 1995 was 12.1 percent and was exceeded only by the United
Kingdom (UK) and Japan, and was in fact almost equal to that of France and Switzerland
combined, on the other hand, this share was less than half of its level in 1981 (24.7
percent). Since 1981 the share of the UK, Germany, France, and Japan had continued to
rise steadily. Furthermore, the Dutch position in the manufacturing sector, while not
unimpressive, has also declined. Some of this is change could be attributable to socio-
economic developments associated with the European Union causing an increased
preference for intra-European FDI and therefore a reorientation of Dutch investments
towards Europe and away from the US. Naturally, these same changes should have
affected firms from other European economies as well. However, there is some evidence
that Dutch firms have responded differently from the other European countries. Despite
their significant share of manufacturing FDI, relative to German, Swiss, and UK MNEs,
Dutch firms have not expanded their US activities, and may even be said to have a much
weaker position than previously.
It should be noted that the phenomenon of Dutch MNE activity is dominated by
a relatively small number of very large firms. As such, any analysis of Dutch FDI and its
use as a measure of Dutch industrial competitiveness must be made with caution, since
the weak performance of 2 or 3 of these large firms can adversely affect the performance
indicators used here, much more so than say, UK or Germany, although the situation is
somewhat similar in the case of Switzerland. As such our analyses continually draws on
a comparison between several countries.
4We start with  a discussion of the changing motivations of inward FDI into the
US. Sequentially, an overview of MNE activity in the US is presented. After that, we
evaluate how Dutch FDI has changed over the period 1950-1995, focussing on
understanding the changes in the Locational (L) advantages of the US relative to those
of the Netherlands, and the Ownership (O) advantages of Dutch MNEs. Throughout
comparison is made to MNEs from other European countries. Conclusions are given in
the final section.
FDI IN THE US: UNDERSTANDING CHANGING MOTIVATIONS
During most of the post-war era, the US has played host to a large share of total
world-wide stock of inward FDI. Indeed, statistics indicate that it has been the largest
single host country throughout most of this century (Wilkins 1989, Dunning 1988). This
is not altogether surprising, given its large market size, both in per capita and in absolute
terms. Indeed, what is peculiar is that on a per capita basis, the US has received a
relatively lower level of FDI than other countries at similar level of development, and of
more limited market potential (Dunning 1993b). Numerous studies have been undertaken
on understanding the determinants of FDI in the US, both empirical and qualitative (see
e.g., Grosse and Trevino 1996, Graham and Krugman 1994, Dunning and Narula 1994)
and we will not attempt to summarise these here, except to observe that these
determinants indicate that changes in FDI in the US have been driven by economic
imperatives, as well as what might best be described as strategic factors.
The economic factors are both push and pull. The ‘pull’ factors represent those
identified in the traditional economics literature, such as market access, reduction of risk,
access to immobile resources, overcoming trade and non-trade barriers, etc., and are well-
documented in the literature. The literature on internationalisation has explained that
firms tend to first enter overseas markets through trade-supportive investments, in the
situation where barriers to imports prevail, through import-substituting investment, and
where immobile assets need to be utilised, through natural-resource seeking investment.
As has been demonstrated elsewhere (e.g. Dunning 1993b, Dunning and Narula 1994)
much of the inward FDI into the US in the post-war period was initially of these types.
5Although European (and particularly Dutch) firms have been present in the US market
for a considerable while longer, the majority of such investment was also of these types.
It was only much more recently that inward FDI activity has expanded towards high-
value adding activity and gradually becomes increasingly embedded in the US economy,
and that firms have moved towards efficiency-seeking FDI in the US. This has much to
do with the tendency towards rationalisation and globalisation of production among the
Triad and by firms from the Triad occurring over the post war period. This has made it
possible for firms to achieve economies of scale and scope on a Triad-wide basis. 
Despite the increasing similarities across countries, there remains distinct sectoral
and technological specialisation in terms of competitive advantages by firms in particular
regions and countries (Archibugi and Pianta 1992). Firms seeking access to
complementary assets and competitive advantages that are associated either with the
competitiveness of the location or with the competitive advantages of the firms located
there, have been ‘pushed’ to engage in outward FDI in order to do so. This in turn has led
to a concentration of value-adding activities on a world-wide basis in particular locations
which reflects the advantages of each region or location. This dynamic has been further
enhanced by the declining barriers to trade and investment amongst and between the
Triad economies, and a corresponding relative decline in trade and investment with much
of the developing world. Inward FDI in the US has, since the late 1970s, seen
considerable investment by MNEs seeking to achieve such efficiency, and MNEs have
gradually increased the extent and range of their value adding activities in the US.
At the same time as this increasing rationalisation along economic lines, there has
also been a growing use of strategic asset-seeking activity by MNEs . By ‘strategic’ we1
mean activities which affect the long term product-market positioning of firms such that
they improve the firm’s value without necessarily reducing net costs in the short term.
Investments are made by firms to acquire assets which are specific to other firms or
locations. Strategic asset-seeking activity has been noted to be a phenomenon also closely
associated with globalisation, and is increasingly prevalent over the last decade or so
(Dunning and Narula 1995, 1996). Strategic asset seeking MNE activity has occurred
through new modes of investment, such as through the use of strategic alliances and
mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Over the period 1989 to 1995, 80 percent of investment
6outlays in the US have been through acquisitions rather than greenfield investment, the
majority of which (72.8 percent) were conducted through existing US affiliates.
It is important to note that the changing structure of FDI activities of foreign firms
reflects the evolving economic structure of the US and that of the various home countries,
and that these changes represent ‘exogenous’ factors. In particular, the shifting focus of
MNE activities over the past 50 years from manufacturing to services represents a
gradual evolution, over time typical of most advanced industrial economies .2
ROLE OF FDI IN THE US
Although prior to 1980 no figures were provided regarding the share of foreign
affiliates in the US economy, successive surveys published by the Department of
Commerce during the post war period indicate that foreign-owned establishments have
played a relatively insignificant role in the US economy with the exception of the
chemicals sector, where by 1974 12 percent of the US gross product in that sector was
accounted for by foreign-owned affiliates (McClain 1983: 284). By 1977 inward
investors accounted for no more than about 2 percent of total non-bank employees.
However, foreign MNEs did have a larger influence on US exports and imports. Foreign
MNEs accounted for 20.0 percent of US exports, and 28.0 percent of US imports in that
same year. The high share of exports was attributed to large grain exports by foreign-
owned firms. A substantial portion of US imports consisted of motor vehicles and metals
and minerals, and affiliates were relatively highly concentrated in those two wholesale
trade industries (Howenstine 1980). 
By 1980, foreign affiliates employed 1.1 million employees, just 5.5 percent of
the total manufacturing employment in the US. Overall, FDI activities of foreign firms
in the US experienced a sudden surge of inward investment activities in the early 1980s,
which has continued since then. Graham and Krugman (1991) argue that when the ratio
of FDI flows to GNP is examined, there is little evidence of a sudden surge, but rather
of a long term trend of an expanding role of foreign firms in the US economy, similar to
that typical of other advanced industrial economies. By 1990 foreign firms accounted for
10.6% of total employment and their importance as employers continues to rise both in
7absolute and relative terms. By 1994, foreign affiliates employed 2.1 million people
which was 11.8 percent of the US workforce in that year (Fahim-Nadir and Zeile 1996,
OECD 1994).
The most recent attempt to evaluate the significance of foreign-owned firms to
the US economy on an aggregate basis has been summarised in two articles published in
the Survey of Current Business . Table 1 summarises some of the most salient facts from3
these surveys, extended by some more general information of FDI activity in the US
around the same time.
In 1990, foreign-owned firms accounted for 13.4 percent of the total value added
by US manufacturing industry. The analysis by the Department of Commerce suggests
that foreign affiliates are relatively more efficient than US based firms - foreign-owned
firms utilise larger plant scale, their employees are paid better and are more productive
than the average US firm (Table 1). However, they are also concentrated in just a few
sectors. Foreign-owned MNEs are particularly dominant in food and kindred products,
printing and publishing, chemicals, stone, clay and glass products, electronics and
electrical equipment, and transportation equipment. In only the chemicals and stone, clay
and glass products sectors is the foreign share over a quarter of total value added in the
US.
In terms of country differences, although Dutch firms have a considerable share
of the activities of foreign-owned affiliates in the US, these are concentrated in even
fewer sectors, namely food and kindred products, chemicals, and electronic and electrical
equipment (Table 2). It is interesting to note, however, that the majority of Dutch FDI
activity is not in the manufacturing sector. In 1990, the share of manufacturing in total
FDI stock was only 38.6 percent compared to 58.6 percent, 46.0 percent, 55.4 percent,
and 73.2 percent for Switzerland, the UK, Germany and France, respectively. It is also
pertinent to note that although Dutch total investments in the mentioned manufacturing
sectors are relatively large, their contribution to the US economy is not equally important.
For example in the chemical sector, the Swiss investment position was only a third of that
of the UK and the Netherlands, yet its contribution to total foreign value added in the US
was 4.2 percent, compared to 3.3 percent for the Netherlands and 5.7 percent for the UK
in 1991. Germany’s 1990 FDI stock in chemicals was comparable to that of the 
8Table 1 Evidence on the Role of Foreign Affiliates in the US Economy
All France Ger- Nether- Switzer UK
countries many lands -land
Number of Industries 
(SIC, four digit), 1991 410 160 174 98 NA 272
FDI Position, 
Year end 1990, historical cost basis 396702 18665 28309 63938 17745 102790
Manufacturing 157431 13669 15695 24717 10393 47304
Share in Total Investment
Manufacturing 39.7 3.4 4.0 6.2 2.6 11.9
Food and Kindred 0.4 0.0 1.9 D 2.2
Chemicals 9.6 2.1 2.1 0.8 3.4
Primary and Fabricated Metals D 0.3 0.4 D 0.8
Machinery D 0.8 1.0 0.7 1.2
Other manufacturing 1.0 0.7 0.9 0.4 3.4
Share in country total 
Manufacturing 39.7 73.2 55.4 38.7 58.6 46.0
Food and Kindred 5.8 8.0 0.4 11.6 D 8.4
Chemicals 11.6 21.8 29.3 12.7 18.4 13.1
Primary and Fabricated Metals 3.9 D 4.2 2.2 D 3.2
Machinery 6.9 D 11.7 6.2 16.0 4.7
Other manufacturing 11.5 20.8 9.7 5.9 7.9 16.6
Plant scale, 1991 (thousands of US$)
Us Owned Establishments 3373 3977 2914 3811 NA 3342
Foreign Owned Establishments 19209 15957 24035 25753 NA 14336
Production worker wages per hour
(US$), 1991 
Us Owned Establishments 11.37 11.66 11.43 11.61 NA 11.53
Foreign Owned Establishments 12.87 13.36 13.30 12.00 NA 11.87
Number of Establishments, 1990 11934 1217 1045 618 697 3291
Share in all countries 100 10.2 8.8 5.2 5.8 27.6
Number of Employees, 1990 2004235 178324 229007 123424 133934 456618
Share in all manufacturing 10.64 0.95 1.22 0.66 0.71 2.42
employment US
Output per production worker per
hour, 1991, (US$)
Us Owned Establishments 115 133 100 122 NA 120
Foreign Owned Establishments 182 160 165 210 NA 168
Value-Added in Foreign
Establishments (Million US$) 1990 177360 15390 20442 11648 14829 40325
Share per industry
All manufacturing 13.4 1.2 1.5 0.9 1.1 3.0
Food and Kindred Products 13.8 0.8 0.3 2.1 2.8 4.1
Printing and Publishing 10.1 0.5 1.2 0.5* D 2.8
Chemicals and Allied products 31.9 1.9 6.1 3.3 4.2 5.7
Stone, Clay, and Glass products 24.8 6.6 1.8 0.5 1.5 5.1
Electronic and otherelectric equipment 15.6 0.8 2.1 2-3* 0.7 2.4
Transportation equipment 4.9 0.5 0.2 <0.05* D 0.8
Source: Howenstine and Shannon, 1996; Howenstine and Zeile, 1994; US Department of Commerce,
various years * authors estimate, # Survey of Current Business, August 1992
9Netherlands, but its contribution to total foreign value added in that same year was almost
twice as large. While the Netherlands has had a large influence based on historical
investments, in most sectors other countries like the UK and Japan, and even other small
open economies like Switzerland, now have a larger influence on the US economy.
Further details are set out in Table 1. 
DUTCH MNE ACTIVITY IN THE US
This section gives an overview of Dutch FDI activity in the US. The analysis is
divided over three time periods. The first period, 1950-1972, covers the time after World
War II up to the termination of the Bretton Woods agreement. The second period covers
the years 1973-1979, when there was a large increase in investment activity in the US due
to the increased liquidity position of European countries after the abolition of the gold
standard. The last period covered is 1980 to 1994, when investments in the US have
come to maturity.
Dutch MNEs in the US: 1950-19724
At the end of the second world war, the US was at the height of its technological
and economic hegemony. The war had left most European and Japanese firms with
limited financial resources that were primarily devoted to the process of reconstructing
their domestic production capacity. Moreover, their O advantages were severely depleted,
particularly their technological assets, and they were in no position to compete with the
US MNEs who were expanding into Europe after the war, much less invest in US
production facilities, where costs were among the highest in the world (Dunning and
Narula 1994). The shortage of capital also led to home government regulations that
severely limited capital exports. Despite this, outward FDI stocks  in the US had5
exceeded their pre-war level of US$1.8 billion in 1937, to US$3.4 billion in 1950. Much
of this investment was dominated by the UK, Canada and the Netherlands which
controlled 34.4 percent, 30.3 percent, and 9.8 percent of the total inward FDI stock in
1950 (Table 2). In terms of manufacturing FDI share, Canadian firms accounted for 41.1
10
percent of all inward manufacturing FDI stock, while the UK and the Netherlands
accounted for 29.6 percent and 3.9 percent respectively (Table 2). Most of the Dutch FDI
stake was in the petroleum sector, where Dutch FDI represented 55.8 percent of the total
inward FDI in that sector in 1950. Data for 1950 is relatively sparse, but the evidence
indicates that Dutch manufacturing firms had a very small presence in the US, compared
to MNEs in other countries. Although these figures are in current terms the changing
significance can be gauged from the fact that Swiss firms’ manufacturing FDI stocks
were five times that of Dutch firms in that year, although in terms of total FDI stocks they
had almost exactly the same value.
Although inward FDI into the US continued to grow at a rapid rate through much
of the 1950s and 1960s, reaching US$6.9 billion in 1960 and US$13.3 billion by 1970,
the situation remained much the same. In terms of relative share of total FDI, the
Netherlands was still the third largest investor overall, following the UK and Canada.
However, Dutch investment continued to be concentrated in the petroleum sector,
particularly given the continued expansion of Shell into the US market after the war. 
In the first survey of post-war assets of foreign investments in 1959 (US
Department of Commerce 1962), FDI in the manufacturing sector represented 22.1
percent of the outstanding Dutch FDI stock in the US in that year, compared with 47.8
percent for Canada, 55.2 percent for Switzerland, and 32.2 percent for UK. In absolute
terms, Dutch stocks were still much lower than those from other MNE home countries.
The manufacturing stock of the UK was 3.5 times that of the Netherlands, though UK
firms’ manufacturing sales were only 1.6 times as high. A similar comparison for
Switzerland gives corresponding ratios 2.0 for stocks and 0.7 for manufacturing sales.
Although some of this discrepancy can be attributed to the use of historical cost basis for
estimating stocks, thereby causing investments of earlier vintage to be understated, both
the UK and Switzerland had been significant investors at about the same level of the
Netherlands for about as long. This would indicate that either the O advantages of Dutch
manufacturing MNEs were much superior to those of Swiss and UK MNEs, particularly
with regard to utilising a much higher scale of production, or they were involved in a
much higher level of intra-firm trade. 
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Table 2 Stock and Share of Inward FDI in the US, 1950-1979 
(million US$ and percentage shares)
1950 1955 1960 1965 1967 1970 1972 1979
All areas
Total investment 3391 5079 6910 8797 9923 13270 14868 54462
Canada
Total investment 1029 1541 1934 2388 2575 3117 3466 7154
Share in total inward FDI in US 30.3 30.3 28.0 27.1 25.9 23.5 23.3 13.1
SMTI* 45.5 46.1 48.2 51.0 54.3 58.9 63.5 50.5
SMDMI** 41.1 40.4 35.7 35.0 33.4 29.9 30.3 17.3
Netherlands
Total investment 334 613 947 1304 1508 2151 2357 12672
Share in total inward FDI in US 9.8 12.1 13.7 14.8 15.2 16.2 15.9 23.3
SMTI 13.2 20.7 22.5 25.2 25.7 30.3 32.6 27.6
SMDMI 3.9 7.2 8.2 9.4 9.3 10.6 10.6 16.7
Switzerland
Total investment 348 522 773 940 1096 1545 1675 3449
Share in total inward FDI in US 10.3 10.3 11.2 10.7 11.0 11.6 11.3 6.3
SMTI 58.6 54.0 55.2 62.8 67.9 74.2 71.3 66.1
SMDMI 17.9 16.0 16.4 17.0 17.8 18.7 16.4 10.9
UK
Total investment 1168 1749 2248 2852 3156 4127 4987 9796
Share in total inward FDI in US 34.4 34.4 32.5 32.4 31.8 31.1 33.5 18.0
SMTI 28.9 29.2 32.1 29.4 32.0 33.7 34.5 36.2
SMDMI 29.6 29.0 27.7 24.1 24.1 22.7 23.7 17.0
Japan
Total investment na na 88 118 108 229 -154 3493
Share in total inward FDI in US na na 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.7 -1.0 6.4
SMTI na na na 47.5 59.3 30.6 -46.8 19.9
SMDMI na na na 1.6 1.5 1.1 1.0 3.3
Source: US Department of Commerce, Selected data on Foreign Direct Investment in the United
States1950--79; Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Balance of Payments and Direct
Investment Position Estimates, 1980-1986; Foreign Direct in the United States, Operations of US
Affliliates of Foreign Companies, revised estimates for several years.
* Share manufacturing in total investment (SMTI)
** Share of manufacturing in total direct manufacturing investment in the US (SMDMI)
Dutch FDI in manufacturing had begun to grow quite rapidly during the latter half
of the 1960s (Table 2). Between 1965 and 1970, Dutch manufacturing FDI grew at an
average annual rate of 19.7 percent. While this partly reflects its low base, it would
indicate that the O advantages of these MNEs were improving vis-a-vis those of their
European competitors. This was the largest growth rate amongst the significant inward
investors to the US - the next highest growth rate was exhibited by Swiss FDI at 18.8
percent over the same period. This evidence would seem to indicate that the O
advantages of Dutch MNEs were in the ascendancy, relative to those of UK, Swiss and
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Canadian firms. By 1971 the share of manufacturing in the total inward FDI stocks of the
Netherlands, Canada, Switzerland and the UK were 31.3 percent, 60.3 percent, 71.3
percent and 35.2 percent respectively. It is not the objective of the current chapter to
delve into the reasons for this growth. Suffice to say, this recovery represents the effect
of several different factors. First, there was a return of investors, who had had
investments prior to the war, which had either been sold off, sequestered, or neglected,
and this growth simply represented a reinstatement of these activities (US Department
of Commerce 1962). Second, the importance of the US as a destination for exports of
Japanese and European firms led to trade-supportive investments - the GDP of the US
was 1.8 times that of the six founding members of EEC  in 1960. 6
Third, the US represented an important source of various sorts of natural
resources, particularly petroleum and various agricultural products  such as soy beans,7
and investment undertaken in the primary sector often led to upstream vertical
investments in the manufacturing sector. In the 1959 benchmark survey, 44.8 percent of
total sales of foreign affiliates in manufacturing were in the food and beverages industry.
Fourth, there had been a recovery of the O advantages of European MNEs in sectors in
which they had traditional strengths such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals and non-
electrical machinery. The last two sectors tend to involve high transportation and
shipping costs, and significant economies existed through local production, and
accounted for 25.8 percent of manufacturing sales in 1959. In general, though, the US
market was served by non-US firms through exports rather than through hierarchies, with
exports to the US growing at an average annual rate of more then 85 percent between
1948 and 1960 for the Netherlands , 4.7 times the growth rate of FDI stock. The volume8
of Dutch exports (US$ 208.0 million) to the US was almost equal to Dutch FDI stock in
manufacturing in the US (US$ 213.0 million) in 1960.
Unfortunately, data on sub-sectors in manufacturing are not available on a
country-by country basis for the years after 1959. Basing our analysis on a comparison
between data for 1959 and 1973 , however, the evidence would indicate that the most9
important sectors for Dutch MNEs were food and kindred products, chemicals and
electrical machinery. Indeed, these were the same sectors in which the Netherlands had
a comparative advantage in exporting.
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Nonetheless, the importance of FDI remained relatively insignificant compared
to the US economy, relative its market potential and relative their overall FDI outflows
of their home countries. The general liquidity problem, and the shortage of dollars meant
that FDI in the US was primarily supported through reinvested earnings. For instance,
between 1960 and 1970, 55.2 percent of change in total FDI stocks occurred through
reinvested earnings, and 51.0 percent in manufacturing. The ratio for the Netherlands was
74.1 percent and 53.0 percent, respectively (US Department of Commerce 1984). In
terms of FDI stock as a percentage of US GDP, Dutch FDI grew from 0.07 percent in
1960 to 0.10 percent in 1970. Overall, much of Dutch FDI was of a trade-supportive
nature, given the advantages of Dutch firms.
Dutch MNE activity in the US: 1972-1980
The termination of the Bretton Woods agreement, which led to the abolition of
the gold standard and the subsequent introduction of floating exchange rates boosted the
liquidity position of the major investing economies. There was a subsequent explosion
of FDI activity on a global basis, with worldwide total outward FDI stocks increasing
from US$211.1 billion in 1973 to US$551.0 billion in 1980. This represented a average
annual growth rate of 15 percent, outstripping worldwide GDP and world trade during
this period (Dunning 1993). Outward FDI from the Netherlands grew at approximately
this rate, although its relative share in the US increased only marginally from 7.5 percent
to 7.6 percent.
Although the US was no longer the largest host country in terms of inward FDI
stock by the early 1970s - inward FDI stock in the US in 1973 was US$20.6 billion, while
that in the UK was US$24.1 billion - it was still pre-eminent since it was still the single
largest homogenous market. With the exogenous shocks of the early 1970s, particularly
due to the change in the exchange rate mechanism , FDI flows to the US increased10
dramatically.
As such, in contrast to the previous decades, during the period 1972 to 1980
reinvested earnings accounted for only 33.3 percent of the increase in inward FDI stock.
In manufacturing, only 32.4 percent of growth in FDI stock was through reinvested
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earnings. Dutch manufacturing FDI into the US grew at twice the rate of total outward
Dutch and worldwide FDI stocks (Narula 1996) , but still slower than Dutch petroleum11
inward FDI into the US. 
The cost of production in most of the home countries (which, with the exception
of Canada, were all European) also began to rise considerably, as productivity growth of
most Northern European economies began to slow (van Ark and de Jong 1996), ‘pushing’
out European MNEs, particularly towards the US. The Netherlands was no exception to
this process, with manufacturing GDP increasing by less than 0.2 percent between 1973
and 1979 (van Ark 1995). However, using a basis of value added per person employed
in manufacturing, van Ark and de Jong (1996) illustrate that between 1973 and 1979,
Dutch productivity relative to that of the UK, France and Germany was 16-23 percent
higher, but relative to the United States, it was 13-18 percent lower. This would indicate
that the Dutch MNEs were relatively more efficient than their main European rivals, but
much less so than US firms.
In terms of sectoral specialization, Dutch manufacturing FDI in 1979 continued
to be concentrated in food and kindred (31.4 percent of total foreign investment in food
and kindred in the US), chemicals (12.2 percent of total investment in that sector) and
machinery (20.0 percent of total investment in that sector). However, in both the
chemical and the machinery sector, Dutch MNEs were slowly losing their prominent
position by the end of the 1970s. In the same sectors the importance of the UK was
increasing. Both the UK and Germany were rapidly increasing their position with primary
and fabricated metals. Swiss MNEs, though making a small contribution to total
investment, were rapidly catching up, with new investments growing at a much faster rate
than most other countries in both the primary and fabricated metals and the machinery
sector. 
FDI stock to export ratios for the end of this period reveal that the Netherlands
were serving the US market mainly from their US affiliates (ratio equals 2.8) and not
through exports. The ratio was particularly high in the chemical (6.1) and machinery (2.2)
sectors. For most other countries the pattern was exactly the opposite. Exports are more
than twice as large as total stock for Germany and France, and about 25 percent larger
than stock for the UK. However, Switzerland shows a pattern similar to that of the
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Netherlands - the stock to exports ratio equals 1.5 with a similarly high ratio across all
sectors except machinery. Overall, total investments in the US increased rapidly,
suggesting that the relative L advantages of supplying goods made by EC firms from a
US location increased substantially over this period (Dunning 1993b).
Coming to maturity: 1980--1994
With the rising O advantages of non-US firms, the improving L advantages of the
US as a manufacturing base for these firms led to a swell of foreign investments in the
US. By 1983, the share of manufacturing value added of the US economy accounted for
by foreign affiliates had risen to 7 percent. There were two aspects to this growth. First,
the US continued to represent an important market for most firms from industrialized
countries. Indeed, Rosenzweig (1994) estimates that at least 20 percent of the revenues
of most European and Japanese MNEs derive from their North American operations. This
is particularly true in the case of Dutch MNEs, which, like MNEs from other small
countries, tend to be much more internationalized than firms from countries with larger
home markets (Narula 1996). Furthermore, Dutch FDI tends to be dominated by a
relatively small group of large MNEs. Firms such as Philips and Akzo are amongst the
most internationalized MNEs, with over 90 percent of their sales, and well over 80
percent of their production being undertaken abroad (UN 1996). Table 8.3 shows that
between 1980 and 1986 The Netherlands’ overall investment position in the US
increased, though its share in total is declining from 23.1 percent in 1980 to 18.5 percent
in 1986. Large new investments are made in the food and kindred sector (share of food
and kindred in all Dutch manufacturing FDI in the US increases to over 36.8% in this
period). However, the relative shares of both the chemical and the machinery sectors are
declining. Over the same period, the UK rapidly increased its share in total investment.
However, while it is true that the US remains an important market, European
integration and the overall economic catch-up of European economies had meant that
European MNEs in particular were now faced with a choice of investing and rationalizing
their production activities in an integrating Europe or expanding their US presence. Not
surprisingly, many firms preferred to focus on Europe, given that it represented an
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Table 3 FDI Position of Major European Home Countries
(stock, share per sector and share of sector in total FDI, 1980 and 1986)
Year Country All Petro- Manu- Food Chemi- Primary Machi- Other Finance, Other
Indus- leum facturing and cals and Fabri- nery Manufac- Insurance,
tries Kindred cated turing Real
Metals Estate
1980 France Total stock 3731 42 2291 111 633 555 61 932 119 1279
SAAFDI* 4.49 0.34 6.94 2.28 6.06 15.52 0.87 13.07 0.88 5.26
ICTOTAL** 4.85 27.63 24.23 2.66 40.68
1986 Total stock 7709 D 7195 372 4287 652 242 1643 1501 D
SAAFDI* 3.50 D 10.00 3.06 18.68 8.95 2.10 9.11 3.33 D
ICTOTAL** 5.17 59.58 9.06 3.36 22.84
1980 Germany Total stock 7596 95 3887 43 1815 333 832 864 1216 2398
SAAFDI* 9.15 0.78 11.77 0.88 17.39 9.31 11.89 12.11 8.99 9.87
ICTOTAL** 1.11 46.69 8.57 21.40 22.23
1986 Total stock 17250 45 7426 36 3961 161 2035 1232 1633 8146
SAAFDI* 7.83 0.15 10.32 0.30 17.26 2.21 17.62 6.83 3.62 10.97
ICTOTAL** 0.48 53.34 2.17 27.40 16.59
1980 The Total stock 19140 9265 4777 225 2002 170 1094 1287 2164 2934
Nether-
lands
SAAFDI* 23.05 75.94 14.47 4.62 19.18 4.75 15.64 18.04 15.99 12.07
ICTOTAL** 4.71 41.91 3.56 22.90 26.94
1986 Total stock 40717 11481 13293 4890 3457 493 1732 2722 7449 6151
SAAFDI* 18.47 40.61 18.47 40.26 15.06 6.77 15.00 15.09 16.52 10.03
ICTOTAL** 36.79 26.01 3.71 13.03 20.48
1980 Swi t zer- Total stock 5070 43 3116 586 1154 264 681 430 907 1004
land
SAAFDI* 6.11 0.35 9.44 12.04 11.05 7.38 9.74 6.03 6.70 4.13
ICTOTAL** 18.81 37.03 8.47 21.85 13.80
1986 Total stock 12058 39 7520 D 2137 D 941 1401 2455 2044
SAAFDI* 5.47 0.13 10.45 D 9.31 D 8.15 7.77 5.44 2.75
ICTOTAL** D 28.42 D 12.51 18.63
1980 United Total stock 14105 -257 6166 1098 2301 524 1103 1140 3834 7273
Kingdom
SAAFDI* 16.98 -2.11 18.68 22.55 22.04 14.65 15.77 15.98 22.34 20.33
ICTOTAL** 17.81 37.32 8.50 17.89 18.49
1986 Total stock 55935 11758 16500 2899 5906 782 2338 4575 13218 14459
SAAFDI* 25.38 40.41 22.93 23.87 25.73 10.74 20.25 25.37 29.31 19.47
ICTOTAL** 17.57 35.79 4.74 14.17 27.73
Source: US Department of Commerce
all italics are 1985 data
underlined are data for 1981
*Share in All Areas FDI per industry
**Share of Industry in country total
increasingly homogenous market about the same size of the US. Furthermore, these firms
were already considerably more familiar with Europe, and as such presented a potentially
more profitable option for these firms. As Table 4 shows, the share of outward FDI
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stocks to the US accounted for by the total outward stock outstanding of some major
European home countries declined during the second half of the 1980s, and this decrease
has been mirrored by a corresponding increase in the share of Europe, with the exception
of Switzerland, which was already heavily involved in European markets.
Table 4 Share of Outward FDI stock from major home countries 
to Europe and the US
% of stock in US % of stock in Europe
Country 1985 1994 1985 1994
Netherlands 41.0 25.9 32.8 45.9
Germany 30.3 21.1 43.8 60.6
Switzerland 29.0 24.5 50.5 49.6
United Kingdom 36.6 31.5 27.8 38.0
France 26.3 20.8 58.4 62.8
Source: OECD International Direct Investment Statistics. Table 8, various countries. 
Note: for Switzerland, North America = US.
Overall, FDI activities of foreign firms in the US experienced a sudden surge of
investment activities in the early 1980s, which has continued until the mid 1990s. This
sudden surge of investment, as well as a chronic (and huge) balance of payments problem
prompted considerable concern amongst policy makers and the general public alike,
leading to, among other things, various legislative actions including the Exxon-Florio
amendment and the increased monitoring of foreign-owned affiliate activity by
government agencies  (Graham and Krugman 1991). 
Indeed, the increased protectionism (and in many instances, the threat of
protectionism) displayed by the US led to even further investment by foreign firms, who
wanted to avoid being discriminated against, relative to domestic firms. They did so in
order to pre-empt attempts to limit manufacturing imports (through inter alia, voluntary
export restrictions) as well as attempts to regulate and increase local-content
requirements for foreign (but especially Japanese) firms. This situation was not improved
by an overvalued US dollar. In other words, the L advantages of the US were artificially
enhanced in the early- and mid-1980s by non-tariff barriers and changing macroeconomic
factors. Dutch investments continued to grow, although in terms of total share of inward
FDI from all countries it reached its peak at 24.1 percent in 1981, gradually declining
ever since then. In the manufacturing sector, Dutch MNEs became the largest single
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foreign direct investors in the US in 1981, with a share of 22.2 percent of total inward
FDI stocks , overtaking the UK in that year. Dutch FDI maintained its pole position in12
the manufacturing sector until 1985. In fact, Dutch inward FDI stock grew at almost the
same rate between 1980 and 1985 (26.0 percent) as it had between 1975 and 1980 (29.6
percent). However, in terms of overall growth rates, Dutch FDI was clearly
overshadowed by the growth of Japanese FDI in the US, which experienced growth rates
twice those of most other countries, albeit from a low base. 
The Plaza accord in 1985, which led to a devaluation of the US dollar against the
currencies of its major trading partners, improved the competitiveness of US firms
relative to the exports of its major international competitors. In 1985 and 1986 the yen,
the pound and the German mark rose by  29.4 percent, 26.2 percent and 12.5 percent
respectively against the US dollar. This had the effect of raising the costs of exports to
the US, and spurred further investment into the US by most European firms. Indeed,
manufacturing sales of foreign affiliates grew at 6.7 percent between 1981 and 1983, and
increased to 10.6 percent between 1983 and 1987. However, it is interesting to note that
Dutch sales grew at a negative rate between 1981 and 1983, but grew at 11.6 percent
between 1983 and 1987. Between 1983 and 1987, Swiss and UK manufacturing sales
exhibited growth rates of 15.9 percent and 19.2 percent, respectively. 
Growth of the US economy had stalled, relative to that of much of Europe during
the period 1979 to 1987. GDP per capita growth of ‘Northwest’ Europe  during this13
period was 1.7 percent compared to 1.5 percent for the US. This implied that the relative
attraction of the US had decreased, with the development of the single market,
encouraging European firms to invest in the EC rather than in the US. Indeed,
manufacturing exports to the US from the 5 major European home countries -
Netherlands, UK, Germany, France, and Switzerland increased at 13.1 percent, 22.0
percent, 29.8 percent, 21.0 percent and 20.6 percent respectively between 1983 and 1987,
higher than the growth rates of manufacturing sales of US affiliates over the same period.
For several European countries the ratio of the sales of US affiliates to US
imports from the home economy (hereafter sales to imports ratio)  has been calculated14
and is reported in Table 5. The ratio is used as a proxy for the propensity to supply the
US market with sales from the affiliates that are located in the US, rather than by exports
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from the home country. Although the sales to imports ratio of most EU countries did in
fact decline between 1983 and 1987, it is important to realize that these figures mask
important differences between industries. For instance, this sales to imports ratio in the
food and kindred products and chemicals sector increased between 1983 and 1987, while
electrical machinery declined. These are three of the most important sectors for Dutch
MNEs, which together accounted for 75.8 of total investment in manufacturing in 1986.
It is important to note the magnitude of the sales to imports ratio as well as the direction
of change. For instance, in 1987, Dutch firms revenues in chemicals were 10.7 times that
of the total imports from the Netherlands in that sector, compared to, say, the food sector
where the ratio was 1.5. This indicates that given the relatively high levels of imports and
sales, and the vintage of the investments, chemical firms were relatively decentralized in
their production activities across countries, and that their US operations were ‘stand-
alone’. In other words, these firms were engaged in a much higher level of value adding
activities in the US, than say German and French MNEs. Also, across sectors, the low
ratio for food and kindred sector for Dutch firms relative the UK indicates that Dutch
firms rely on intra-firm trade much more to supply the US market, indicating a much
stronger interdependency within these firms. This probably indicates that Dutch firms
were much more rationalized on a worldwide basis, while the Swiss and UK firms were
utilizing more of a multi-domestic strategy . 15
The sales to imports ratio also indicates that there were considerable attractions
of the US as a production site relative to other locations in the chemicals industry of
Dutch MNEs. However, this is not entirely true for chemical firms of all nationalities.
The sales to imports ratio in chemicals fell for Swiss and German firms, both relatively
large players in the chemicals sector. It did, however, rise for UK firms, and given that
MNEs from the Netherlands and the UK were the most internationalized in terms of
geographical spread and overseas value added activity, it might indicate the presence of
certain O advantages, particularly those associated with the economies of common
governance, as well as what is sometimes referred to as the experience effect (Yu 1992).
In other words, the decline of the sales to imports ratio for foreign owned firms in the US
for manufacturing represented a decline in both the L advantages of the US and the
strength of the O advantages of foreign firms . The ratios of the other sectors tell a16
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similar story. 
It would seem that Dutch MNEs were undertaking a change in their inter-
dependence between their US affiliates and their parent organizations -the ratio of
manufacturing affiliate exports to imports increased from 39.4 percent in 1985 to about
81.9 percent in 1992 (US Department of Commerce 1988,1995). The propensity of Dutch
affiliates to import from the Netherlands did not change very much, but we see an
increasing propensity to export to the parent organization. This clearly indicates that an
increasing integration was taking place between the US affiliates and the rest of the MNE
organization. It is also worth noting that imports exceeded exports since 1977 (the year
in which data on this variable has been systematically been collected), but that the ratio
of imports to exports has consistently declined for Dutch MNEs, while this ratio for the
UK has tended to be about equal and has not substantially changed over time (Zeile
1993). 
After reaching its peak in terms of share of total inward FDI in the US, Dutch FDI
began to slowly decline, in terms of relative manufacturing share from 16.6 percent to
10.2 percent between 1987 and 1995. Although this in part represents the growing
importance of Japanese FDI, it is significant to note that the Dutch position in
manufacturing FDI had already been surpassed in terms of stock (on a historical cost
basis) by the UK in 1986 and Germany and France were rapidly catching up. In terms of
sales, the Dutch position had been surpassed by most other European countries by then
as well. By 1994, the share of manufacturing sales of Germany, France, Switzerland, and
the UK are 2.7, 2.0, 1.6, and 3.9 times larger than Dutch manufacturing sales
respectively. Japanese MNEs were also catching up with total manufacturing stock being
slightly (6.0 percent) smaller than Dutch manufacturing stock in 1994, although total FDI
stock was 46.0 percent larger than that of Dutch MNEs. It is also important to note that
in terms of growth rates, Dutch FDI manufacturing sales grew at 13.9 percent between
1987 and 1992, but displayed negative growth of 0.7 percent between 1992 and 1994, the
latest year for which sales data are available. 
The lackluster performance of Dutch MNEs relative to all MNEs, which
displayed corresponding growth rates of 18.3 percent and 10.2 percent, has partly to do
with the high concentration ratio of Dutch manufacturing firms (Table 1). Much of FDI
is accounted for a small group of parent firms, Philips, Akzo-Nobel, Unilever, and Shell,
21
who are heavily involved in large mergers and acquisitions (M&A) . It also, to some17
extent, reflects the restructuring of Dutch firms in response to increased competition by
other European firms and the increasing presence of Japanese competitors in their
principal markets . However, such pressures also affected MNEs from Switzerland,18
Germany, UK and France. The sales to imports ratio of the Netherlands’ manufacturing
(Table 5) increased from 4.2 to 6.2 between 1987 and 1992, but fell to 5.2 by 1994.
Although the same ratio also decreased for the UK and Switzerland during this last
period, the drop was relatively insignificant, indicating that for Dutch firms the L
advantages of a US production base had initially risen, but had fallen again, and those of
the US relative to the UK and Switzerland had been almost unaffected. This is partly
reflected in the higher growth of GDP per capita of the Netherlands (2.1 percent)
compared to the US (1.6 percent) between 1987 and 1994 , whereas that of Switzerland19
and the UK grew at a much lower rate of 0.3 percent and 1.3 percent respectively. It is
to be noted that the countries with relatively ‘new’ MNEs - Germany and France - have
much lower sales to export ratios for manufacturing - the extent of local production was
less than twice that of exports in most cases, and indicates that these firms were
undertaking a lower extent of value added in the US. For instance, although German
manufacturing sales in 1989 were about 2.0 times that of Dutch firms, the ratio of value
added was 1.8 in 1990. These ‘new‘ MNEs are at a much earlier stage of
internationalisation, and as such tend to depend more on their parent groups than more
established MNEs, who also tend to be more embedded in the host country’s domestic
economy. The imports from the parent companies of German firms were worth about
29.8 percent of sales as opposed to 17.1 percent for Dutch firms, and 7.9 percent for UK
firms in 1992. As such, it might be argued that these firms were at an early stage of
import-substituting investment, and had not fully rationalised their US activity.
On a desegregated level, much of the decline in sales of US affiliates of Dutch
firms was associated with the food products sector, and reflects strong competition
resulting on the US market, resulting in low prices as well as the sale of a plant by
Koninklijke Gist Brocades N.V. to the Canadian firm Lallamand in 1994 , while20
electrical machinery and chemicals both increased their sales to export ratio, albeit
relatively slowly during the most recent period, while the ratio of non-electrical
machinery experienced a sudden decline. This is probably the result of Philips’ disposal
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of the Blockbuster video chain in 1993 . What does contrast with this is the behaviour21
of the other countries (Table 5) where, with a few exceptions, such as the continuous
decline of electrical machinery in the UK, and the decline of electrical machinery during
the most recent period for France, all the rest of the sectors in all the other countries 
Table 5 Sales over Imports , several years, several countriesa
Country Year All Total Food Chemi- Primary Non- Electrical Total Other
indus- manufac- and cals and Electrical machinery machi- manu-
tries turing kindred fabricated machinery nery fac-
metals# turing
France 1983 6.7 2.2 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.8 3.8
1987 4.2 1.7 1.1 1.5 0.7 * * 1.9 1.9
1992 6.1 2.8 2.0 4.9 7.5 0.5 5.0 1.6 2.5
1994 6.8 3.2 2.4 5.5 5.1 1.2 2.7 1.7 2.6
Germany 1983 4.0 1.9 0.4 10.4 1.1 0.9 1.8 1.3 0.7
1987 2.7 1.1 0.2 6.6 1.7 0.3 1.9 0.7 0.5
1992 4.4 1.9 0.7 6.3 2.6 0.7 1.9 1.1 1.1
1994 4.6 2.0 0.7 6.3 2.7 0.9 2.8 1.5 1.1
Netherlands 1983 15.9 4.4 1.3 8.9 * 0.5 * * 2.0
1987 11.8 3.9 1.6 10.7 0.3 0.3 * * 1.1
1992 17.2 6.2 4.8 15.4 1.3 * * 5.3 1.9
1994 16.6 5.2 2.4 17.9 0.8 0.4 8.9 5.2 1.2
Switzerland 1983 13.6 5.1 * 14.0 * 1.2 2.8 1.5 1.2
1987 9.7 4.6 * 9.8 4.3 * * 1.0 *
1992 13.3 6.5 90.0 9.9 8.0 * * 5.3 1.3
1994 11.9 6.2 71.8 10.3 6.9 * * 4.1 1.7
United  
Kingdom    1983 8.1 3.4 12.6 6.0 1.6 2.0 2.6 2.2 2.3
1987 7.3 3.2 11.3 9.3 3.4 0.8 1.5 1.0 2.7
1992 10.3 5.0 15.9 10.3 5.3 1.2 1.3 1.2 5.8
1994 10.5 4.6 17.9 11.3 5.1 1.6 0.9 1.3 4.1
Source: US Department of Commerce; Benchmark Surveys; Foreign Direct Investment in the United
States, Operations of US Affiliates of Foreign Firms, various issues, U.N. Commodity Trade Statistics,
various years.
 Primary and fabricated metals: data 1986 used instead of 1987 for the Netherlands#
 Ratios are calculated dividing the sales of the foreign affiliates in the US by US commodity imports froma
the home country of the affiliate.
have shown consistent growth. This would imply that either the L advantages of most of
the other European countries had been declining relative to the US while that of the
Netherlands had been improving, or that the competitiveness of Dutch manufacturing
MNEs had reduced relative to those of their (US and European) competitors. There is
clearly some truth in both of these factors. Evidence on the growth of real gross hourly
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wages indicates that as a location, the Netherlands was a much more competitive location
to engage in production relative to other Northwest European location, since wages
increased at 0.2% between 1987 and 1994, while that of North-western Europe increased
at 1.4 percent (van Ark and de Jong 1996). Data on relative productivity also confirms
this, and the fact that Dutch productivity in manufacturing, albeit lower than US
productivity was showing signs of catching up, compared to its European competitors.
Table 6a Intrafirm imports, several countries, 1982, 1987 and 1992
All Share of By foreign By other By
mfg foreign
Country Year indus- Manufac in total parent group % foreigners % affiliates %
tries turing
France 1983 3575 1838 51.4 2657 74.3 918 25.7
1987 4330 1773 40.9 3264 75.4 1066 24.6 365 8.4
1992 8275 5391 65.1 4673 56.5 3602 43.5 1104 13.3
Germany 1983 8722 2289 26.2 7073 81.1 1649 18.9
1987 17264 4312 25.0 14999 86.9 2265 13.1 360 2.1
1992 19029 8054 42.3 15422 81.0 3608 19.0 591 3.1
Netherlands 1983 4309 884 20.5 1237 28.7 3072 71.3
1987 4268 1443 33.8 1687 39.5 2580 60.4 77 1.8
1992 7968 2891 36.3 4297 53.9 3671 46.1 837 10.5
Switzerland 1983 2125 719 33.8 1184 55.7 941 44.3
1987 4269 1632 38.2 3258 76.3 1011 23.7 27 0.6
1992 5290 2914 55.1 3877 73.3 1413 26.7 98 1.9
UK 1983 7961 1861 23.4 3236 40.6 4725 59.4
1987 10622 3339 31.4 4980 46.9 5643 53.1 110 1.0
1992 12241 6042 49.4 6804 55.6 5437 44.4 514 4.2
Source: US Department of Commerce; Benchmark Surveys, various issues; Foreign Direct Investment in
the United States, Operations of US Affiliates of Foreign Firms, revised 1982 estimates.
On the other hand, the declining share of Dutch manufacturing FDI, as well as the
slow growth rates of Dutch manufacturing sales in the US indicate that there was also a
decline in their O advantages. Although, given the highly rationalized nature of Dutch
MNEs, it might be expected that Dutch MNEs were now supplying their US market with
cheaper substitutes produced in Eastern Europe, less than 1.3 percent of the Dutch
outward FDI stock in Europe was located in Eastern Europe (OECD 1996). Furthermore,
were this the case, we would expect to see a rise in intra-firms imports from “other
affiliated firms”, which excludes those from the parent of the MNE. Although the share
of such imports as a percentage of total intra-firm imports by Dutch affiliates increased
from 1.8 percent in 1987 to 10.5 percent in 1992, this also includes intra-firm imports by
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firms in the petroleum sector (Table 6a).
 Furthermore, there has been a gradual decline in the expenditures on
manufacturing plant and equipment expenditures. As a percentage of total plant and
equipment expenditures by foreign affiliates, the Netherlands has fallen from 4.6 percent
in 1983 to 3.5 percent in 1994, while that of the UK has gone up from 15.3 percent to
19.2 percent over the same period. In fact, in 1994 only 16.1 percent of all plant and
equipment expenditures were made in manufacturing, compared to 41.7 percent for the
UK (Table 6b).  
Table 6b Property, Plant and Equipment
Gross Property, % Manufacturing 
Plant & Equipment Manufacturing in total expenditure
France 14682 5810 39.61983
1987 17945 8942 49.8
1992 42986 26114 55.5
1994 47189 28078 54.9
Germany 22042 13787 62.51983
1987 25342 15845 62.5
1992 52182 29154 52.2
1994 64679 34834 51.2
Netherlands 38250 4267 11.21983
1987 45954 5617 12.2
1992 58913 10262 16.5
1994 63229 10663 16.1
Switzerland 10110 6235 61.71983
1987 13202 9325 70.6
1992 24330 18088 69.8
1994 24988 20399 77.0
UK 47187 14122 29.91983
1987 62056 21897 35.3
1992 99863 48205 41.9
1994 125271 58341 41.7
Source: US Department of Commerce, Benchmark Surveys, various issues; Foreign Direct Investment in
the United States, Operations of US Affiliates of Foreign Companies, revised 1983 estimates; preliminary
1994 estimates
What of the argument that Dutch FDI activity has been in the process of global
rationalization and gradually moved towards sectors and activities which are technology
intensive? In fact, Dunning and Narula (1995) show that overall, Dutch R&D intensity,
when measured as a ratio of R&D expenditures to sales , after having risen from 0.922
percent in 1977 to a peak of 1.1 percent in 1985, have fallen consistently every year, and
in 1994 stood at 0.8 percent. while figures for manufacturing are not available across all
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years, even in the sectors in which the Netherlands has traditionally held competitive
advantages, food products, chemicals and electrical machinery, the R&D intensities in
1994 (Table 7) were 0.1 percent, 2.2 percent and 2.5 percent while those for the UK were
0.7 percent, 4.3 percent and 3.3 percent, and for Germany, 0.2 percent, 4.6 percent and
6.2 percent  respectively. This is particularly indicative of the O advantages of Dutch23
MNEs, given the following facts. First, that in terms of patenting activities large Dutch
MNEs (which dominate Dutch FDI) undertook 57.8 percent of their patenting activities
in overseas R&D labs, of which 26.1 percent was undertaken in the US (Patel 1995) .24
Second, data from a cross-European survey indicate that in general firms located in the
Netherlands are less innovative, in terms of ‘new’ innovations than their counterparts in
5 other European countries  (Kleinknecht 1995). 25
Table 7 R&D intensity, percentage shares, 1994
Industry France Germany Netherlands Switzerland United Kingdom
All industries 1.25 1.61 0.81 3.15 1.02
Manufacturing 2.64 3.27 2.02 5.12 2.26
Food and kindred products 0.40 0.23 0.11 D 0.72
Chemicals 3.51 4.57 2.21 10.76 4.32
Primary and fabricated metals 1.06 0.85 0.88 0.86 0.67
All machinery 3.86 3.53 2.45 2.16 1.64
Non-electrical machinery* D 1.25 0.71 D 1.00
Electrical Machinery D 6.16 2.51 D 3.34
Other manufacturing 2.06 1.69 0.73 D 1.22
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, Operations of
US Affiliates of Foreign Companies, preliminary 1994 estimates
* Germany’s R&D intensity in electical and non-electrical machinery given for 1992
In general, therefore, it can be said that much of Dutch FDI in manufacturing was
in a market-oriented, efficiency seeking mode. In an age where most global firms are
increasingly utilizing organizational modes that provide more flexibility, such as
networks and strategic alliances, Dutch firms were also increasingly engaged in strategic
asset-seeking activity . As has been noted elsewhere (Narula and Dunning 1997),26
globalized firms tend to increasingly utilize non-majority owned activity, often through
strategic alliances to develop and sustain competitive advantage. There is some indication
of a growing tendency among Dutch MNEs to use an increasing amount of non-majority
owned affiliates. Although UK firms have also exhibited a similar decline, between 1992
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and 1994 MNEs from Germany, Switzerland and France have not changed their
preference for wholly owned firms. There has also been a growing propensity to use
mergers and acquisitions rather than greenfield investments. In the case of Dutch firms,
73.0 percent of all investment outlays between 1992 and 1995 had been made to acquire
existing US establishments.
CONCLUSIONS
The evidence presented here may be summarized succinctly as follows: 
1. Dutch FDI activity, though considerable, was primarily concentrated in the
petroleum sector until the mid 1970s. In the manufacturing sector, Dutch MNEs, as was
the case with MNEs in general, had not played such a significant role in the US economy
until the 1980s. Dutch MNEs reached their apogee during this time, at one point
accounting for a quarter of all FDI stocks in the US.
2. Dutch MNEs have gradually expanded their operations in the US, in response
to the changing competitiveness of the US relative to the Netherlands. Thus, the extent
and structure of their value added had reflected the changing motives for their investment
activity and the structure of their technological specialization. Dutch FDI activity has
gone from trade-supportive in the 1950s and 1960s, to import-substituting and market-
seeking in the 1970s, and rationalized and efficiency seeking in the 1980s. There are also
indications of a simultaneous use of strategic asset-seeking FDI activity in the late 1980s
and early 1990s in line with the developments associated with the age of alliance
capitalism, whereby firms are increasingly using alliances and networks as a means to
develop competitive advantages.
3. The competitiveness of Dutch firms, in terms of their O advantages has also
gone through a cycle, where the competitiveness of Dutch MNEs was much superior to
those of their major European rivals until the mid 1980s. Since then, however, the O
advantages of Dutch firms have not developed relative to those of these competitors, and
this has been reflected in the declining role of Dutch manufacturing MNEs in the US
economy relative to those of Switzerland, UK and Germany. Nonetheless, it is difficult
to separate the effects of a re-orientation of Dutch activities towards Europe in response
to increasing economic integration, from those due to the slowing down of Dutch MNEs
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growth in the US due to declining competitive advantage of these firms. However, it is
reasonable to expect that the pressures and attractions of the single European market
would have had an equally powerful L advantage for its European competitors of other
nationalities, and as such we can assume that much of the decline reflects weakening O
advantages.
The analysis conducted here must be interpreted with caution. First, because we
have utilized an aggregation across countries and across sectors, to analyse what is
essentially a firm-specific, and in the limit, an industry-specific phenomenon.
Nonetheless, given that we have made a cross-country comparison, our discussion clearly
illustrates some general trends, which are valid and supported by other research, both on
an aggregate, cross country basis (see e.g., Archibugi and Pianta 1992), and on a country
basis (Kleinknecht 1995, Slabbers and Verspagen 1995). It should be noted that work on
the activities of Dutch MNEs per se is under-represented in the literature (for an
exception see Barkema, Bell and Pfennings 1996) and as such the current chapter thus
represents exploratory research. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, since Dutch MNEs are concentrated in a
few sectors, the detailed operating statistics on the sectoral level is limited. For reasons
of confidentiality much of the detail is suppressed, since most of Dutch FDI is dominated
by a few very large firms. As a result, the data is highly sensitive to the economic well-
being of any one of these firms. In other words, the competitiveness of Dutch firms in
many instances represents the competitiveness (or the lack thereof) of a handful of firms,
and in some sectors, just one conglomerate. Nonetheless, this state of affairs mirrors that
of the Dutch economy, where 6 firms  account for 16.3 percent of total industrial27
employment in 1987 (Belderbos 1989).
It should be stressed that the decline of manufacturing content of Dutch FDI
activity, and the subsequent growth of investments in services is in itself not surprising.
Along with most other developed countries, both the Dutch and the US economy have
moved towards a services based economy. The service sector accounted for 70.0 percent
and 72.0 percent of the GDP of the Netherlands and the US in 1995, compared to 64.0
percent for both countries in 1980 (World Bank 1997). Indeed, service MNEs such as
ING, ABN AMRO, Ahold, and Aegon have been investing aggressively in the US in
order to attain market share, particularly through M&A activity. Indeed, between 1990
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and 1995, Dutch FDI stock in services has increased by a factor of 1.3, and the sales of
these firms accounted for 34.6 percent of all sales by Dutch affiliates and 4.2 percent of
all service sales by foreign affiliates the US, up from 30.0 percent and 3.7 percent
respectively in 1987. In terms of assets, 57.0 percent of all Dutch assets  were in service28
in 1994, compared with 29.6 percent in 1987. Less than 36.6 percent of the total
investment outlays between 1987 and 1995 by Dutch firms were in manufacturing. This
restructuring does not necessarily represent a negative event, but a logical and long
expected outcome as we move into a post-industrial era. Furthermore, manufacturing
MNEs from the Triad have gradually been relocating their more labour intensive and
lower value adding aspects of their manufacturing establishments to industrialising and
developing economies which still have a comparative advantages in these activities.
However, there is some reason for concern when the high-value adding activity and skills
intensive aspects of manufacturing such as R&D and computer aided manufacturing are
relocated to other Triad countries rather than remaining in the Netherlands. 
As recently evaluated by a survey produced by IMD (the world competitiveness
yearbook 1997), the Netherlands ranks 6  in the world, 4  among OECD countries, andth th
third in Europe, following Finland and Norway. It is difficult to do any statements about
the future of Dutch MNEs on the basis of these data because the yearbook evaluates the
competitive strength of the whole economy. It measures, among other things, several
aspects of the domestic economy, government activity, finance, and science and
technology indicators, but no company specific information is given in the report.
Therefore the survey must be interpreted with caution.  However, at the present time
there is insufficient evidence for alarm, as the Netherlands remains one of the most
competitive economies in Europe. 
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1. Strategic asset seeking MNE activity is originally hinted at in the work by Knickerbocker
(1973).
2. For an in-depth discussion of the tertiarisation of industrial economies, see Bellak (1993).
This line of thought derives itself from the work of Chenery and Taylor (1968). 
3. Howenstine and Shannon (1996) and Howenstine and Zeile (1994). 
4. Data in this paper are based on the various publications of the US Department of Commerce,
rather than De Nederlandsche Bank, unless otherwise stated.
5. All FDI stock figures used here are in current US dollars, based on historical cost estimates.
6.  Prior to 1972, the EEC consisted of Germany, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg
and Italy.
7. Exports in the primary sector from the US were over 30% of total US exports in 1960
(Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1982-1983, US Department of Commerce).
8. Secretariaat-Generaal van de Benelux Economische Unie (1981) Benelux 1948-1979
Statistieken - Tijdreeksen.
9. The first year for which the US Department of Commerce published sectoral data for a
considerable number of countries again. 
10 . Due to the abolition of the gold standard, exchange rate movements were large, leading to
large depreciations of the US$ against the other currencies. For example, in June 1973 the Mark
appreciated more than 11% against the US dollar. 
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11. It is to be noted that from 1974, inward FDI was reclassified from a threshold of 25% of
foreign ownership to 10% ownership. However, this does not severely affect the comparison,
as the change led to a 5% increase in the direct investment stock position in 1974.
12. There was a sudden increase in Dutch manufacturing stock in 1981, when it doubled its
1980 value. It is interesting to note that although investments expanded, most Dutch firms
report difficulties with sales in the US in 1981, due to the recession, in their annual reports.
13. Northwest Europe, based on the usage of van Ark (1996: 20) implies the following
countries: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland
and UK. Figures are annual compound growth rates.
14. For example the sales of Dutch affiliates in the US (based on the US Department of
Commerce, Benchmark Survey and FDI data) are divided by total US commodity imports from
the Netherlands (based on the UN commodity trade statistics). In specific sectors, we divided
the sales of the Dutch affiliate in that particular sector by total US imports of commodities in
this sector. 
15. The low sales to imports ratio is not a typical characteristic of the industry - this same ratio
for the UK was 12 times that of the Dutch ratio (Table 5), indicating that it represents a firm
or country-specific difference.
16. Although for Dutch and UK firms in the chemicals sector there was a continuing
improvement in the L advantages of the US. However, these countries do not reveal any
competitive strength in this specific sector. The Netherlands started off having a revealed
comparative advantage (RCA) in chemicals at the beginning of the 1980s, but over the decade
it declined. It strength in primary and fabricated metals and transportation remains and has
grown larger. The non-electrical machinery and the electrical machinery sectors both show a
relatively large RCA, but it is declining over time.   
17. For a discussion, see Duysters and Sadowski, chapter 7 in R. van Hoesel and R. Narula
(eds.) (1988) Multinational Enterprises from the Netherlands, Routledge: London, forthcoming.
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18. For instance, Japanese firms accounted for 11% of the European automobile market in
1990 (Narula and Gugler, 1991).
 Analysis is based on van Ark and de Jong (1996) who used GDP per capita data in constant19.
1990 prices. To make a country comparison, we used World Bank GDP data in constant 1987
prices.
 Quite surprisingly, Unilever actually expanded its food and kindred activities by acquiring20.
ice-cream companies that turned out to increase their sales over the next years. At the same time
Unilever sales in detergents declined severely all over the world, due to the OMO Power
incident. In 1994 CSM also expanded its activities in the US by a takeover of Henry and Henry
in New York State. These acquisitions contrast the sales data, although one should realize that
most acquisitions are finalized at the end of the year and sometimes sales by these new firms
are not reported until the next year.
21. Unfortunately the data do not allow a thorough analysis of what happened to Philips. For
reasons of confidentiality, the data are suppressed in publications of the US Department of
Commerce. However, it is well known that Philips performed massive restructuring of its
activities during this period. 
 
 R&D intensity is just one of the indicators of the innovativeness of a country. One can also22.
consider output indicators such as patents, or productivity growth. There is some debate about
the relevance of R&D-statistics as indicators of innovation. One school of thought (see
Snijders) emphasizes that R&D expenditure is an input indicator, not taking into account other
factors like education. Furthermore, R&D intensity is influenced by the size of the country, the
sectoral structure, and with increasing globalization it is common that the fruits of R&D activity
occur in a different country than where that where expenditure is made. Another school of
thought (see Verspagen) refutes this critique by explaining the economic justification for using
R&D intensity, namely the external effects that occur, eventually leading to economic growth.
 Data for electrical machinery for German MNEs was for 1992.23.
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24. See also Cantwell and Janne, chapter 4 in R. van Hoesel and R. Narula (eds.) (1988)
Multinational Enterprises from the Netherlands, Routledge: London, forthcoming.
 The study compared innovations in “new” products and “imitative” products. New products25.
are those which have were not earlier introduced by competitors. The countries compared are
Netherlands, Ireland, Norway, Denmark, West Germany and Austria.
26.  For an elaborate discussion see Duysters and Sadowski, Chapter 7 in R. van Hoesel and
R. Narula (eds.) (1988) Multinational Enterprises from the Netherlands, Routledge: London,
forthcoming.
 Philips, Royal Dutch/Shell, Unilever, Akzo, DSM, and Hoogovens.27.
 Includes assets in the following sectors: wholesale trade, retail trade, finance except28.
depository institutions, insurance, real estate and other services.
